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Abstract 
This article analyses EU competition law to identify its theoretical influences. It finds that 
there are two distinct periods. The first, the ‘mono-theoretical period’, is influenced by 
Ordoliberalism. The second, the ‘poly-theoretical period’, has a number of influences, not 
least the Chicago School, post-Chicago analysis and behavioural economics. These new 
theories refine the way the law is used to achieve Ordoliberal aims, in particular, the aim of 
protecting economic freedom. This insight is then used to analyse the EU competition law 
approach to software markets. This reveals that software markets have characteristics that 
allow dominant, up-stream software firms to conceal the choice consumers have (choice 
evasion) and undermine competition. Recommendations on how to avoid this abuse are 
made. 
Introduction 
The Google Android case has just resulted in a fine of €4.34 billion. Perhaps more 
importantly the decision is already being criticised with one author stating that ‘[i]t’s hard to 
find any antitrust expert, European or American, who has endorsed the logic or outcome of 
the ruling by the European Commission’.1 It has also drawn the ire of the President of the 
United States who is already of the view the EU Competition Commissioner ‘really hates the 
U.S.’.2 At first glance, this criticism may be easy to understand: in the last two decades, 
breaches of EU competition law have meant Google has been fined €4.34 billion for Android, 
fined €2.4 billion3 for abuses of its shopping search and another is soon expected. Microsoft 
Corp over two decisions has been fined €1.34 billion.4 In addition, there has been a €12 
billion state aid decision against Ireland5 for is tax arrangement with Apple Inc. and a €250 
million state aid decision against Luxembourg6 due to their arrangements with Amazon.7 
This may suggest that either the EU Competition Commission (the Commission) has an 
extremely strong distaste for US technology companies or that Silicon Valley simply cannot 
bring itself to work within the EU’s competition framework. The truth is neither of these 
conclusions are quite true. Rather, the simple fact is that, in relation to anticompetitive 
conduct, EU regulators are exploring how to apply the competition rules to new business 
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models in a new world of digital services just like the other major competition jurisdictions. 
But this does not mean companies are left unable to understand how the law applies to 
them. The rules can be understood and applied predictably, but what is essentially to enable 
this, is to understand the foundational economic principle that forms the corner stone of EU 
competition law, a corner stone that currently has no corresponding feature in US antitrust: 
the protection of freedom. 
This article, therefore, has two goals corresponding to its two main sections: first to 
establish, using the law on tying as an illustration, the economic theoretical influences on EU 
competition law; second, to apply those theoretical insights in order to explain some of the 
more complicated and controversial EU competition decisions in the technology markets in 
recent years and, using this new found understanding, explain its implications for the fast 
moving, innovative technology industries of both the United States, the European Union and 
beyond. 
This will be done as follows:  First, the article will analyse the EU’s competition 
jurisprudence8 to ascertain which economic theories have influenced tying law and when 
they did so. In so doing, this analysis will show, that it is no longer true to say that EU 
competition law is ‘largely static and immune to influence from economics’9 but rather that it 
is continually taking on new economic influences and incorporating these into the application 
of the law. It will track the law as it has absorbed different economic influences starting with 
Ordoliberalism in the 1950s all the way to behavioural economics in the present day. Thus 
contributing to the debate on the aims10 and theoretical underpinnings11 of EU competition 
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law.12 This section itself will be broken down into two subsections, the first analysing what 
the author describes as the ‘mono-theoretical period’; a period where the only clearly 
identifiable influence on EU competition law was Ordoliberalism. The second subsection 
analyses what the author calls the ‘poly-theoretical period’; a period where the influence of a 
number of economic schools of thought becomes apparent. 
The second section will then use these theoretical insights to explain the current difficulties 
and challenges facing the technology industry, in particular, dominant US technology 
companies. This section will also be broken down into two subsections. The first explains the 
inplications of the (Ordoliberal) desire to protect economic freedom and how it has led the 
Commission to focus on ensuring both third parties who are use the software of dominant 
firms and the technology companies’ consumers are free to choose the combination of 
products/services that they consider best. The next subsection will analyse how this desire 
has led to a concern for what this author calls ‘choice evasion’; the ability of a dominant 
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upstream company to make consumers less likely to utilise alternative software by 
concealing the fact a choice exists. The rationale behind this concern will be explained and 
this will be used to make testable predictions in relation to the (as yet unpublished13) Android 
case against Google.14 Finally the way forward will be set out explaining how the law is likely 
to develop in future and what technology companies should be aware of in order to avoid the 
bruising fines being levied by the Commission. This will therefore be of particular use to 
dominant firms active in the EU software markets. 
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The economic influences on EU Competition Law 
There have been two main periods in EU tying law. The first period extends from the signing 
of the EEC Treaty to just before the Microsoft I Commission decision15 and the second 
period extends from the Microsoft I Commission decision until the present day. This first 
period will be referred to as the mono-theoretical period due to it only including clear 
influences of a single theory during this time: Ordoliberalism. The second period will be 
referred to as the poly-theoretical period due to the clear imprint of a number of theoretical 
influences, from Ordoliberalism to behavioural economics. 
This will be demonstrated in the following manner: First, the mono-theoretical period will be 
analysed. This part will set out the various Ordoliberal concepts that have been incorporated 
into the law. Second, the poly-theoretical period will be considered. This will includes 
analysis of the Microsoft I case,16 the Guidance17 and the Microsoft II18 commitments 
decision. The Microsoft I judgment will be used to demonstrate the difference in approach by 
the courts and Commission to foreclosure before Microsoft I, when a causal link between 
tying and foreclosure was largely assumed and in the Microsoft I case, when the existence 
of a causal link was carefully analysed in light of the specific characteristics of the market. 
This method of identifying economic harm is then compared with and shown to have 
characteristics consistent with post-Chicago analysis. Next, analysis of the Guidance will 
show it contains a number of references to tying situations that are likely to cause economic 
harm that are identical to those posited by post-Chicago and even Chicago theorists. Finally, 
an assessment of the Microsoft II commitments decision will show that it employs insights 
from behavioural economics. This influence will be highlighted in the following aspects of the 
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decision: the use of survey data to look beyond ‘rational choice’ assumptions, consideration 
of default bias in the remedy and the remedy itself. 
It is useful to understand at this point that whilst during the poly-theoretical period a number 
of new theories begin to be visible in the law, these new theories are used to determine the 
presence of anti-competitive effects. In contrast, the fundamental aims of the law show a 
surprising consistency. The Ordoliberal principles established in the mono-theoretical period 
are still relevant and applied even now and thus the influence of Ordoliberalism runs through 
both the mono- and the poly-theoretical periods. Therefore, while it appears that 
Ordoliberalism is no longer the only economic influence on the law on tying, it has not been 
replaced by more recent forms of economic analysis, rather, in the present poly-theoretical 
period, Ordoliberal rules and objectives (e.g. protection of market access) are now being 
pursued thorough detailed and sophisticated forms of economic assessment, such as post-
Chicago analysis, where appropriate. 
The mono-theoretical period 
It has been argued recently19 that Ordoliberalism appears to have had a strong influence on 
the treaty provisions on tying law, primarily because the original Treaty Article on tying (now 
Article 102(d)) has a clear connection with the German competition law equivalent in the 
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB), and that on the basis of the evidence 
available and the significant Ordoliberal influence on policy at the time, this provides 
evidence that EU Treaty provisions on tying are based upon Ordoliberalism. But this 
considers only the Treaties. The next step is to analyse whether the case law flowing from 
the Treaty bears the same hallmarks of Ordoliberalism. 
The analysis undertaken in this article reveals a number of aspects of Ordoliberal thought 
that can be found within the decisions of the Commission, judgments of the courts and 
opinions of the Advocate Generals. These include the following: the definition of monopoly, 
                                               
19
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the special responsibility of dominant firms and the requirement to behave ‘as if’ subject to 
competition.20 It is argued that this is significant evidence of an Ordoliberal influence on EU 
tying law.  
Starting with the definition of monopoly: when Hilti was being decided before the General 
Court, it was restated that a dominant position was characterised by the ability of an 
undertaking to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and 
therefore ultimately of customers.21 This follows the pattern of market characterisation 
expressed by the Ordoliberal Walter Eucken when explaining his empirical test for identifying 
whether a market is a monopoly, partial monopoly, oligopoly or whether it is a competitive 
market.22 Likewise in the Tetra Pak II decision, the fact that the dominant undertaking’s 
contract clauses were so onerous, lead the Commission to believe that it was dominant 
because it was ‘barely conceivable’ that customers would agree to such restrictive clauses in 
a competitive market.23 This again demonstrates that the Commission was using the 
undertaking’s ability to act independently of their customers to show they were dominant. 
Perhaps one of the most obvious Ordoliberal aspects of EU competition law is the special 
responsibility held by dominant firms. It is an established doctrine that a dominant 
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undertaking has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to distort competition.24 This 
again is a tenet of Ordoliberalism.25 
There is, finally, the requirement that dominant undertakings behave ‘as if’ subject to 
competition. In the Centre Belge judgment the Court said that in order for an abuse to exist 
the undertaking must use its dominance and the resulting lack of competition to: ‘obtain 
advantages which it could not obtain if there were effective competition’.26 Preventing a 
dominant undertaking from obtaining advantages which it could not obtain in a competitive 
market bears a very strong resemblance to the requirement set out by some Ordoliberal 
thinkers that, where a monopoly exists or ‘natural monopoly’ exists, the dominant 
undertaking should be required to act ‘as if’ it were subject to competition.27 Logically if an 
undertaking is prohibited from making use of benefits that would not be available if 
competition did exist, it is essentially being required to act ‘as if’ it is subject to competition. 
Finally one of the most important aspects of EU competition law in relation to Ordoliberalism 
is the pre-eminence of choice. This is not choice merely in terms of the variety of products or 
services, but a broader concept encompassing the freedom and ability to make economic 
decisions. This concept will not be covered here as it has already been reviewed elsewhere 
in some detail.28 Suffice to say however that economic freedom of choice, whether for 
buyers, suppliers or consumers, is a crucial part of the economic structure upon which 
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competition is built from an Ordoliberal perspective.29 Consequently, this is further evidence 
of the influence Ordoliberalism has had and continues to have on EU competition law. As will 
be discussed in section two, it is this element of Ordoliberalism (and EU competition law), 
which is so crucial to understanding the Commission’s approach to technology markets, as 
illustrated so clearly by the Google decisions. 
The Poly-theoretical period 
Prior to the Microsoft I30 case there had been little express economic analysis included in 
Commission and court decisions leading some to criticise the Commission for a lack of 
economic rigor.31 For example, foreclosure was almost assumed after a dominant 
undertaking had been found to be tying.32 Although, foreclosure was considered occasionally 
in the pre-Microsoft I case law, but it was not analysed in detail.33 Jones and Sufrin state that 
the Commission found abuse after ‘very little analysis of the market’.34 As a consequence, 
the law on tying prior to Microsoft I was castigated as being ‘largely static and immune to 
influence from economics’.35 As a result the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy 
suggested that a more economic approach should be taken.36 
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However, the Microsoft I37 decision marks a watershed moment when the greater use of 
economic analysis began to be incorporated into the pursuit of tying. In particular the 
Commission began to make use of the work of post-Chicago theorists. More recently, they 
have made use of the findings of behavioural economics scholars.38 (Although it is being 
stated here that the Commission and courts have embraced this approach, there are few 
court judgements to confirm whether the courts are fully committed to this new approach. 
What can be seen so far is that the EU courts have not resisted this new approach and are 
willing to engage with this new analysis.39) Therefore it is from this point that the law on tying 
entered the poly-theoretical stage. These new theories, it will be seen, did not supplant 
Ordoliberalism, but rather became part of the assessment process to establish economic 
factors relevant to determining the appropriate application of the law in pursuit of Ordoliberal 
aims. 
The Microsoft I decision 
The Microsoft I decision related inter alia to tying Microsoft’s dominant operating system 
‘Windows’ with Microsoft’s media player ‘Windows Media Player’ (WMP). This case was a 
landmark decision because, for the first time, it took what could be considered to be a more 
economics based approach to assessing whether the dominant undertaking had abused its 
position by tying its products. It did this under the heading ‘foreclosure’40 and to understand 
its significance it is important to first understand how foreclosure was dealt with in decisions 
prior to Microsoft I. Foreclosure’s express inclusion in the new test for tying articulated in the 
decision has paved the way for greater use of economic theories of exclusion to be taken 
into account. 
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Foreclosure prior to Microsoft I  
Prior to the Microsoft I decision, foreclosure was an implied requirement dealt with under the 
heading of ‘market access’. In the Hilti decision the Commission stated that Hilti had abused 
the market by attempting to ‘limit the entry of independent producers’41 into the market. It 
was also said that aspects of Hilti’s commercial behaviour were ‘designed’ for that purpose42 
stating that their policy was to ‘hinder new entrants’ by obstructing access to the tying 
product needed to make use of the tied product.43 Other Commission decisions have 
emphasised the need to protect small competitors from behaviour designed to: exclude 
competitors from the market,44 protect ‘equality of opportunity’, particularly for ‘new market 
entrants’,45 and other similar concepts. So while there was no express requirement of 
foreclosure prior to Microsoft I there was still a concern when the actions of the dominant 
firm would have the effect of excluding competitors unfairly.  
The strongest example of effects similar to ‘foreclosure’ being evaluated before Microsoft I 
are found in Tetra Pak II. Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer noted in his opinion that 
the Court had held that one of the reasons for the behaviour being abusive was because it 
limited access to the market by other producers46 but greater analysis is found in the 
Commission decision, where Tetra Pak was described as limiting ‘competition to the area 
most favourable to it’.47 The Commission said that Tetra Pak’s contract ‘closes the door to 
any competitor on the maintenance and repair services market’.48 This is all but the same as 
stating that there is foreclosure of the maintenance and repair market. Discussing a product 
tie in the same contract the Commission stated that their:  
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‘system of tied sales…makes the [tied] market completely dependent on the [tying] 
market … They place competitors … in an extremely uncomfortable position.’49 
 
Further analysis continued:  
 
‘[Through tying] Tetra Pak thereby limits competition to the area which is most 
favourable to it, i.e. that of machines, where the technological entry barriers are very 
high … these same contractual clauses prevent the emergence of any competition in 
the [tied] sector, where the technological barriers are much lower.’50 
 
Therefore, it can be seen that the Commission has previously considered foreclosure pre-
Microsoft I and to a very limited extent there was even some discussion regarding the 
economic impact of tying obligations, but it is limited in scope and detail and it was not stated 
that foreclosure was required for a tie to exist, rather it was set out as one of its negative 
effects.  
Foreclosure in Microsoft I  
In Microsoft I the Commission makes it clear that it did not assume foreclosure existed, 
expressly stating that since users could obtain third party media players from the internet 
free there were ‘indeed good reasons not to assume without further analysis that tying WMP 
constitutes conduct which by its very nature is liable to foreclose competition.51 Therefore the 
Commission went further and analysed whether or not Microsoft’s behaviour foreclosed or 
‘harmed’ competition.52 To demonstrate that this was the case an economic argument was 
presented setting out how the Commission believed, by tying WMP to Windows, Microsoft 
could credibly start a feedback loop that would eventually result in Microsoft’s dominance in 
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the media player market almost independent of the quality of its media player.53 As such the 
Commission set out that:  
 
1) Microsoft’s behaviour would result in WMP being present on almost every personal 
computer;54 
2) That this ubiquitous presence would act as an incentive for content producers to code 
their audio and film only in Microsoft’s proprietary format;55  
3) That this move towards content producers coding their content in one single format would 
then result in consumers moving to WMP;56  
4) That the move towards customers using WMP instead of other media players would 
damage competition from the market;57 and,  
5) Consequently control over the Windows proprietary format would act as a serious barrier 
to entry to any new entrants to the media player market even if their media player was 
technologically superior.58  
 
The Commission also considered other ways for Microsoft’s competitors to get their media 
players onto users computers59 and whether these methods were sufficient to undermine the 
foreclosure effect of Microsoft’s tie.60 They were deemed not so. 
 
When the decision came before the Court its analysis was concise. The Court stated that 
Microsoft had merely asserted that the finding of foreclosure was based on conjecture and 
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had not succeeded in showing that was the case. While this does not add much to the 
discussion of foreclosure specifically in Microsoft I, it is very important more generally. First it 
suggests that the Court does now consider foreclosure important in determining a tie. 
Second, the Court’s response suggests that it would be willing to consider economic 
arguments that undermine or empirically demonstrate that the Commission’s arguments on 
foreclosure are conceptually or empirically flawed.61 This opened the way for far greater use 
of economic theory and the use of empirical economic evidence in the analysis of tying. That 
said, how far the court is willing to go to analyse large volumes of complicated economic 
data is yet to be seen. 
Foreclosure and the Post-Chicago Approach  
By presenting the theory of harm set out above the Microsoft I judgement engaged in greater 
economic evaluation of the effect of the tying behaviour. This approach appears to conform 
to a Post-Chicago approach. In contrast to other schools of thought (most obviously the 
Chicago School, which tends to look at cases through price theory and from this devise 
general conclusions62) Post-Chicago analysis tends to analyse competition problems by 
considering the behaviour of the market actors in the context of that particular market.63 The 
analysis of Microsoft I included looking at the way in which ‘network effects’64 affected the 
decision making process of content and application producers. The foreclosure loop itself is 
based upon the reactions of market actors, such as content producers, to the actions of 
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other market actors. So, for example, the Commission anticipated that with the tie in place 
media content producers would not code their content on the basis of the best media 
software available, but rather they would chose WMP on the basis that the tie would mean it 
was ubiquitous. This consideration of the particular characteristics of the market combined 
with the analysis of the likely decisions of market actors65 in light of other market actors’ 
behaviour reflects a Post-Chicago approach to assessing the effect of Microsoft’s tie. 
Having considered the case law that has been handed down during the poly-theoretical 
period, it is now necessary to consider some of the soft-law that has been published by the 
Commission, to show that this too exhibits a poly-theoretical character. 
Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article [102] of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings  
Since the Microsoft I decision, the Commission has released a communication giving 
guidance on its enforcement priorities when applying Article 102 of the TFEU to exclusionary 
conduct.66 The Guidance is particularly useful in demonstrating the new desire within the 
Commission to take account of and apply the latest economic thinking in the application of 
competition law. This demonstrates the Commission’s clear departure from the mono-
theoretical period and commitment to a poly-theoretical approach. 
 
Analysis of the Guidance yields two points of particular note in relation to the theoretical 
basis of tying: The Guidance confirms that the restriction of customer choice determines the 
presence of a tie and further confirms the importance of economic theory in the 
Commission’s assessments. 
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In relation to the first point, the Guidance continues to hold customers’ freedom of choice as 
a defining characteristic of tying law. It states that: ‘[e]vidence that two products are distinct’ 
includes evidence that, ‘when given a choice, customers purchase the tying and the tied 
products separately from different sources of supply’.67 The customers’ freedom to choose 
the combination of products that suits them best is the driving force behind the law on tying68 
and as such the restriction of this freedom is an essential element in determining the 
existence of a tie. 
Secondly and most importantly, the Commission’s Guidance demonstrates a deliberate 
attempt to incorporate economic theory into its policy and decision-making. In conformity 
with earlier law, there are references to Ordoliberal doctrine, for example: market power 
being the ability of a competitor to act appreciably independent of its competitors and 
customers,69 but there are also elements that strongly reflect the work of Post-Chicago 
authors. In terms of general principles, the Commission states that it will take into account 
the specific facts and circumstances of each case.70 This alone does not prove a strong 
Post-Chicago link, but it shows that the Commission will consider how the specific 
characteristics of each market affect each case, a further move away from assuming abuse 
exists per se as soon as a tie and dominance is established. Further, the guidance appears 
to taking into account game theory based corporate behaviour. That is where undertakings 
make decisions based upon the likely behaviour and reactions of other market actors. The 
Guidance states that when predicting expansion or entry of a market it will take into account 
inter alia ‘the likely reactions of the allegedly dominant undertaking and other competitors’.71 
This consideration of market actors’ reactions to certain behaviour is characteristic of Post-
                                               
67
 ibid, para 51 
68
 Matthew. Cole, ‘Tying law in the European Union: theory and application.’ (Ph.D. thesis, Cardiff University 
2014), chapter 4 
69
  Commission, ‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ (Communication) (2009) OJ C 45/02, para 10  
70
 ibid para 8, 9  
71
 Commission, ‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ (Communication) (2009) OJ C 45/02, para 16  
Chicago analysis.72 These aspects of the Guidance are of a general Post-Chicago character, 
of even greater significance however are the following references that are far more 
identifiably Post-Chicago in character. 
The Guidance states in reference to tying that the risk of anti-competitive foreclosure is 
expected to be greater where the dominant undertaking makes its tying strategy a lasting 
one, for example by tying in a manner that is costly to reverse.73 Although there is no 
citation, this is based upon the work of the Post-Chicago theorist M. Whinston.74 The 
Guidance also states that if there is a tie, and the tied product of that tie is an important 
complementary product for the customers of the tying product, reducing the number of 
suppliers of that tied product through tying may make entry into that market more difficult.75 
These concepts mirror the arguments made by Carlton and Waldman.76 The Guidance 
explains that when two products can be used in variable proportions to a production process, 
increases in the price of one element may be avoided by customers if they can increase their 
use of the other product. In such a scenario, tying the two products together can allow the 
dominant undertaking to avoid this risk and raise prices.77 This reflects the economic theory 
of harm established by Burnstein.78 Burnstein is a member of the Chicago School, thus this 
demonstrates that the Commission, although rejecting some of the general tenets of the 
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Chicago School’s approach,79 are willing to incorporate their work where they consider it 
appropriate. This is evidence that all economic theories will be considered by the 
Commission, and thus confirms that the Commission has truly entered a poly-theoretical 
period. 
The final reason why the Guidance is of great importance is because it shows that this new 
poly-theoretical approach is not limited to tying law alone. It is clear from the title of the 
Guidance80 as well as the topics covered in its contents that it is intended to apply to Article 
102 abuses generally. This shows that the poly-theoretical approach applies to a wide range 
of anti-competitive behaviour and not just tying.81 Before moving on from the Guidance it is 
also worth mentioning that although the Guidance intended to address criticism82 that the 
Commission needed a more economic approach,83 whether such an approach has been 
implemented,84 whether it has been accepted by the Commission and courts, or even if it is 
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considered desirable85 is still a hotly contested subject. This is not least because of the 
varying economic approaches that exist, as can be seen from the current discussion. After 
the Guidance there is one final source of evidence that needs to be analysed: the 
Commission commitments decision against Microsoft. 
The Microsoft commitments decision: Behavioural Economics comes to EU competition law? 
The commitments decision86 between Microsoft and the Commission was the first tying 
decision to be reached by the Commission since the publication of its Guidance. It shows 
that the Commission has continued to utilise new theories of economic harm, in this decision 
considering and applying the findings of behavioural economics research in order to identify 
and resolve tying problems. While behavioural economics is not identifiable by reference to a 
specific overarching theory of behaviour (it has none presently87) the decision has a number 
of aspects that highlight the influence of behavioural economics. Namely: the use of survey 
data to look beyond rational choice assumptions, consideration of default bias in the remedy 
and the remedy itself. 
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In the Microsoft II decision the Commission explained a theory of foreclosure, which was 
very similar to that which was used in the Microsoft I case.88 What is interesting about this 
decision however is not the theory of foreclosure89 itself, but rather the way in which it 
reached its decision. The Commission considered that Microsoft gave its browser an 
‘artificial distribution advantage’ by being tied to its Operating System (OS) and found that 
Microsoft’s competitors had no alternatives that would offset this advantage.90 The 
Commission proffered that this was because there were issues overcoming users’ ‘inertia’ to 
get them to change browser from that which was pre-installed,91 and other market specific 
issues such as users’ ability to search, choose and install competing web browsers, which 
can be difficult if the users lack the required skills, understanding or confidence to do so.92 
The Commission supported this supposition with market surveys.93 These surveys stated 
that of all Windows users who had never or had only once downloaded a web browser, 31% 
said they did not know how to install or download software, 15% replied that they consider 
downloading or installing software as difficult or complicated, 8% fear security risks and 7% 
were not aware that they could download a web browser.94 The consumer survey was all the 
more stark in its findings. It reported that: ‘84% of Windows users who use Internet Explorer 
as their primary web browser never use another web browser on their computer because 
they are unaware of the other options, or because they do not want to [download] or do not 
know how to download.’95  
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The Commission’s use of surveys to establish why customers were not exercising their 
freedom of choice in a way that rational market actors may be expect to do so appears to be 
consistent with the behavioural economics methodology, which is in contrast to the ‘rational 
choice’ theorist’s assumption that all customers are rational market actors seeking to 
maximise their subjective utility and who will thus select the best browser available for them 
all things being equal. This is actually quite ground breaking. A search through the 
competition judgements of the courts and Commission decisions shows that in only one 
other case customer surveys have been used in a similar manner to try to understand 
customer behaviour96 and in that instance it appeared to be more concerned with what 
decisions customers would make in future, given various different possibilities, rather than 
what lead the customers to make decisions previously. 
The decision also referred to biases that have been identified by behavioural economics. 
Behavioural economics has established a number of ‘irrational’ behavioural traits that can 
influence market actors and it has been argued that these traits must be taken into account 
when formulating the law.97 One of these is that people feel worse when they actively make 
a decision that leads to a loss than when they suffer a loss due to inaction. This has been 
described as ‘status quo’ bias98 and inertia.99. In this context this bias would mean users are 
reluctant to change their internet browser for fear of using a browser that is actually inferior 
to the one already installed (which is the status quo). 
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This effect appears to be clearly and expressly recognised in the decision: To begin, the 
Commission’s decision explicitly uses the term ‘inertia’100 in this context and further states, 
when considering the option to have Windows shipped with its browser inactive as a default, 
that ‘defaults are generally considered to have a strong effect on user behaviour’.101 This 
clearly demonstrates that the impact of status quo bias was being considered when deciding 
whether or not to turn off Internet Explorer as the default setting. 
Finally, the remedy that was offered102 by Microsoft and accepted by the Commission103 
shows the hallmarks of behavioural economics in its design. The main commitment offered 
by Microsoft was that it would provide a ‘choice screen’ for users. This would be a piece of 
software sent to computers in the European Economic Area running Windows through the 
Windows update mechanism. If the user had Microsoft’s browser set as the default web 
browser, it would display to the user two windows, one informing the user of the importance 
of web browsers and what they do, and a second giving the user the option of downloading 
one of twelve of the most popular browsers (by market share). The list of browsers would be 
updated every six months.104 The list would be populated in accordance with market share, 
but the order of the browsers in the list would be randomised so as not to produce a bias in 
favour of those browsers in one particular position.105  
This remedy appears to have been designed to overcome status quo bias. By asking users 
to choose their web browser, selecting Internet Explorer becomes a choice rather than a 
default. If users wished to use Internet Explorer they were able to do so, but if they had only 
used Internet Explorer previously because of a bias towards inaction, then they would now 
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no longer have a default selection made for them. Consequently the user would be placed in 
a position where they had no obvious status quo106 to rely on and this would make them 
more likely to decide on a browser based on the merits of those browsers presented. As if 
this was not sufficient evidence in itself, press announcements in relation to the Google 
Android case now contain explicit reference to status quo bias107 proving that the 
Commission is now confident enough to openly rely on concepts established in behavioural 
economic theory. 
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The implications of theory for practice 
Until this point the focus has been on the theoretical influences on EU competition law: the 
continuing influence of Ordoliberalism, combined with the increasing use of sophisticated 
economic theory to ensure that the Commission pursues genuine threats to competition and 
the importance of protecting economic freedom as a goal of competition law. This section 
applies those very same insights to explain how the Commission and courts are seeking to 
preserve that same economic freedom in technology markets. The reason why technology 
markets have been chosen is because they have characteristics that give rise to a new form 
of anti-competitive harm that is only prevalent in software markets. This anti-competitive 
harm the author calls ‘choice evasion’. It will be argued that due to the specific 
characteristics of the software market; high fixed and low marginal costs, network effects, 
automatically activated software and often a lack of understanding of the market/software on 
the part of the consumer, dominant undertakings are able to hinder competition in software 
markets. This is done through the dominant undertaking utilising the aforementioned 
characteristics to obfuscate the choice that consumers have, making them less likely to 
understand there is a choice and consequently far less likely to use it. This type of 
competitive harm is not possible in traditional markets, but will become an increasing 
concern for competition authorities as technological development increases the scope for 
implementing a choice evasion strategy. Further, this theory will be shown to be supported 
by the recent statements made with regard to Google shopping108 and it will be used to 
make predictions regarding the unpublished Commission decision against Google in 
connection with its Android mobile operating system.109 
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Economic freedom and technology markets: The emergence of the software market problem 
Microsoft I110 demonstrates a difficulty that arises when applying tying law to software 
markets. The problem becomes apparent when looking at the remedies that were applied 
and their effects. Prior to Microsoft I, tying cases’ remedies were very simple. Under 
Regulation 17/62 Article 3111 the Commission had the power to require infringements to be 
brought to an end. The Commission did this by requiring the tie to be broken, allowing users 
to purchase the products/services independently. This was done in Hilti,112 in Tetra Pak II,113 
while in London European/Sabena and Napier Brown/British Sugar the infringements had 
been brought to an end when the Commission began to intervene.114 In these traditional, 
non-software markets an order to simply end the infringement sufficed. 
This same approach was used in Microsoft I. The Commission determined that Microsoft 
had tied its Windows OS with WMP and ordered that Microsoft provide a new version of its 
operating system that came without WMP installed115 (Windows N) thus breaking the tie. 
However this remedy, although legally successful in the sense that it was put into effect by 
Microsoft, was a total failure in terms of sales volume.116 In the time Windows with WMP had 
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sold 35.5 million copies, Windows without WMP sold 1,787 copies.117 Customers were not 
exercising their freedom of choice.118 If the purpose of the remedy was to facilitate and 
liberate customers to choose their own media player and thereby spur competition, the 
Commission had failed. 
The Commission’s enhanced approach to software tying (Microsoft II) 
In light of the previous failure it is perhaps not surprising that in the next tying decision in a 
software market (involving Microsoft tying Internet Explorer to Windows) the Commission 
changed its approach. The Commission, rather than pursuing the case, accepted 
commitments119 to which Microsoft agreed to be bound. This included a number of minor 
commitments120 and the most significant commitment, that of the ‘choice screen’121. 
This decision is interesting for two reasons: Firstly, this novel remedy goes beyond requiring 
the independent sale of the tying and tied good. Secondly, the description given by the 
Commission as to how Microsoft’s tying behaviour would foreclose the market, although 
potentially flawed,122 helps explain what is argued here to be the actual anti-competitive 
harm the Commission is trying to resolve in software tying cases: choice evasion. 
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 Although not essential to this paper it could be argued that the theory of foreclosure in Microsoft II was 
flawed due to the different expectations of users of browsers when compared with software such as media 
If the Commission simply followed their previous decisions then to rectify the tie they would 
merely require Microsoft to make Windows available without Internet Explorer. They did not, 
and this marks an important departure from previous decisions because it shows that the 
Commission appears to realise that tying in the software market cannot be dealt with using 
the same remedies as in other markets. As already discussed above, in the Microsoft I case 
and prior to the Microsoft I case the Commission’s remedies were consistent and simple; the 
firm was required to break the tie. This remedy failed to work in Microsoft I as even when the 
tie was broken customers still bought the tied products together. In Microsoft II the same 
decision could have been taken, but instead Microsoft was required to install a choice screen 
where users would be informed what a browser is and given an opportunity to install one in a 
safe environment. Why did the Commission choose to do this? Why require a choice screen 
and treat this market differently to others? It is argued that the reason why the Commission 
has been forced to treat the software market differently begins to be revealed when the facts 
given by the Commission, describing the threat of foreclosure in Microsoft II, are examined. 
Choice evasion: the real threat to competition in software markets 
The facts given in the commitments decision can be seen to represent a new theory of anti-
competitive harm that the Commission appears to be gradually discovering. This theory of 
foreclosure only exists in software markets and can be used by dominant undertakings to 
impede competition; it is called ‘choice evasion’. Choice evasion occurs when a software 
firm does not give customers the option to avoid installing or to uninstall tied software. By 
doing this consumers may be unaware that there is any distinction between the dominant 
                                                                                                                                                  
players. Media players play content in a particular format. These formats are generally not interchangeable. 
What will play on one player does not play on another media player. Consumers expected this as it has largely 
been the case since streaming media players began to be popular. Thus if Microsoft could incentivise content 
creators to code in Microsoft’s proprietary format this would act as a barrier to entry for other media players. 
The complete reverse is true of browsers and web content. HTML (Hyper Text Mark-up language) is the coding 
language used to encode webpages. It can be interpreted by any browser. Consumers expect their browser to be 
able to access any web-page. As a consequence it is likely that if a user cannot access a web-page because it 
only works with one particular browser, the web-page will be considered inferior rather than the browser. This 
creates a strong disincentive for webpage content creators to programme webpages that work exclusively with 
Internet Explorer and without this there would be no barrier to new browsers as each webpage would continue 
to work with any HTML compatible browser that was created. 
software product and the tied software in the first place. Consequently, the user is less likely 
to realise there are alternatives available because they do not realise that they are actually 
using two different types of software. This illusion means that customers do not realise they 
have a choice of applications and, as a result, they do not exercise it. The aim of choice 
evasion is to make consumers less likely to search out alternatives and pick a different, 
possibly superior software configuration. The dominant company can evade the customer’s 
exercise of choice by hiding the fact that it exists, hence ‘choice evasion’. 
The term ‘choice evasion’ is the author’s own and therefore it is not used in the Microsoft II 
decision expressly. So what is the evidence that it was an underlying concern? When 
discussing potential foreclosure effects, the Commission states ‘users are prevented from 
switching from Internet Explorer to competing web browsers … due to the barriers 
associated with such a switch, such as searching, choosing and installing such a competing 
web browser, which can stem from a lack of technical skills…’123 The Commission referred to 
surveys indicating that of all the Windows users who had never or had only once 
downloaded a web browser, 31% did not know how to install or download software, 15% 
replied that they consider downloading or installing software as difficult or complicated, 8% 
feared security risks and 7% were not aware that they could download a web browser.124 It 
would be interesting to know how many consumers did not fill in the survey because they did 
not understand what the terms meant. The consumer survey indicated that 84% of Windows 
users who used Internet Explorer as their main web browser never used another web 
browser on their computer because they are unaware of the other options, or because they 
do not want to or do not know how to download alternatives.125 This demonstrated a general 
lack of knowledge regarding browsers and the associated technologies. As such, the more 
Microsoft could blur the distinction between its OS and its browser, the less consumers 
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would be likely to consider alternatives.126 The aim as it were, was to make Internet Explorer 
less a browser and more ‘the button for the internet’.127 
The Commission appears to have learnt from the failure of Windows N that resolving tying 
issues in software markets is far more complex than just offering the tying product alone at 
the same price. As such, the Commission required commitments that would not only provide 
Windows free of Internet Explorer, but also overcome choice evasion. This is why Microsoft 
was required to inform users about what a browser did and give them choices about which 
alternative browsers they could download. This would help overcome user lethargy and 
reverse choice evasion by making users aware of the distinction between operating systems 
and browsers and make them aware that alternatives exist in a safe, technologically 
unchallenging environment, rather than subtly hiding it. 
The rationale behind choice evasion 
There are logical reasons why this particular type of foreclosure through tying is a unique 
concern within software markets. These are as follows: 
First, software markets are characterised by high fixed costs and exceptionally low marginal 
costs. This is because the cost of programming a piece of software is very high but once 
programmed the cost of making a second copy is virtually £0.00. As a result there can be 
cost savings by tying software.128 As a consequence, it can be cheaper for a dominant 
undertaking to provide their software together and charge the same price than to market and 
distribute each piece individually. This is not often the case with normal goods such as cars 
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or computers themselves.129 Second, software markets are often subject to network effects, 
this means that having a wide distribution of client software can help capture further market 
share in related markets such as server software, content coding software or other 
interrelated software. Third, software can often be programmed to be activated 
automatically. As such a user who does not want to use the software or is not even aware 
that the software is installed on their computer can find that the software activates itself 
when the user tries to access particular formats or inadvertently engages some other trigger 
mechanism (this reinforces the second element). Fourth, users of software often have a 
limited understanding of how software works, little confidence in changing it and are unable 
to distinguish between various pieces of software and their functions. As a result of this they 
are less likely to be aware that there are competing goods that can perform the same 
functions as well as or better than the software they already have. They are also less likely 
to make use of this software, even if they know it exists, if they are not confident in 
accessing/installing it. 
Finally there is one other characteristic that is essential for the Commission to 
consider choice evasion a threat to competition: being located in an upstream market. This is 
best illustrated by contrasting scenarios where the Commission has intervened to stop 
choice evasion with those where similar behaviour has been permitted without interference. 
In the following scenarios the Commission pursued the dominant firm for abusive 
conduct: Microsoft making Windows available only with WMP (tying), Microsoft making 
Windows only available with Internet Explorer, (alleged tying), Google requiring Google 
Search and Google's Chrome browser to be pre-installed and Google Search set as the 
default search service on manufacturers’ devices, as a condition to license them certain 
Google proprietary apps (tying). 
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 It is also these high fixed costs and low marginal costs that it very difficult to accurately assess the value of a 
piece of software, making it difficult for competition authorities to assess how much an “untied” piece of 
software should cost compared to the price of the tie. 
Now contrast the following situations where the Commission has not alleged that there was 
abusive behaviour: Facebook creating a messenger function and integrating it into its social 
network offering, Google enrolling all YouTube users in Google+ by automatically turning 
YouTube accounts into Google+ accounts and Microsoft making Excel, Powerpoint and 
other applications accessible only as a package in Office 360. 
These two sets of scenarios have a lot in common. In both there are multiple functions being 
combined into a single transaction, single accounts for accessing those multiple functions, 
automatic enrolment and activation without user consent, the potential for significant network 
effects to be generated for the dominant undertaking by significantly increasing the number 
of nominal users and the potential for profits from the dominant element to be used to cross-
subsidise the development and maintenance of the other elements. If the Commission was 
concerned with any of these issues in of themselves, then they would have pursued all the 
scenarios set out. Each could be considered a form of tying as: it requires customers to 
obtain two separate products (as defined by consumer demand), the undertaking is 
dominant in the tying product (Facebook, Youtube and Powerpoint are all arguably dominant 
in their respective markets) and the undertakings do not give customers a choice to obtain 
the products separately. The only requirement that is not clearly satisfied is whether the 
practice forecloses competition. Clearly the Commission considers that those in the former 
group foreclose competition and those in the latter group do not. The distinguishing feature 
between the two groups is vertical integration.  
In each case where the behaviour was pursued, the undertaking concerned was not only 
dominant but held that dominance in an upstream market that they used to control/restrict 
the freedom of firms downstream. If using dominance in one market to exploit network 
effects to gain an advantage in another market through integration is an abuse then all the 
scenarios would be of concern. This shows more is needed for there to be abuse. Viewing 
this issue though choice evasion once again is key. When an upstream producer requires 
the installation of their applications as a condition of accessing their operating system 
(particularly when combined with exclusivity requirements) their software reaches every user 
of their system causing the application to benefit from the associated network effects. But 
this is the same as in the Facebook/messenger scenario. What is different is that users of 
the system will be likely to view the feature as part of the system. As the Microsoft II decision 
describes users are prevented from switching to competing web browsers ‘due to the 
barriers associated with such a switch, such as searching, choosing and installing such a 
competing web browser, which can stem from a lack of technical skills’.130 This is all the 
more of a risk when users do not know that it is possible to obtain alternatives, do not know 
which alternatives exist, do not know how to obtain them, find accessing them complicated 
or fear security risks. 
Some might argue that a Facebook/messenger scenario just lacks the foreclosure effect that 
could be found in other ties because customers are in fact downloading competing 
messenger apps without any problem. Therefore, the Commission would not interevene 
because there is no foreclosure effect. This however just inverts the order of events. There is 
no foreclosure because people are downloading competing messenger apps, but people are 
downloading competing messenger apps, because there is no choice evasion. If choice 
evasion was being successfully implemented this would lead to a reduction in downloaded 
apps and this would draw the attention of the Commission. 
To exemplify this consider the following counterfactual, imagine that rather than Facebook 
integrating a messenger function into its social network, contemplate what would happen if 
instead Google required all manufacturers to install a digital messenger app on Android that 
automatically activated and imported the contacts from the users address book. The user 
would be able to instantly start receiving messages from contacts without activating the 
application or consenting to it being installed. The wide distribution of Android would ensure 
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that most users would have plenty of contacts automatically available and every user who 
did not know how to install alternatives, considered doing so difficult, feared security risks, 
were not aware they could get alternatives or were not aware what those alternatives were 
would have had their choice evaded. They would be users of the hypothetical Google 
service without meaningfully exercising their freedom of choice. Meanwhile their handset 
manufacturer, who in this case would normally have acted as their proxy in making the 
choice for them, may face either contractual restrictions or financial disincentives to 
providing an alternative. For such customers, their choice has been made for them, possibly 
without them ever knowing it existed. Such behaviour would likely be considered abusive, 
but since in reality it was actually carried out by Facebook, which is not upstream, it was not. 
To summarise then, the combination of characteristics described above can allow dominant 
undertakings to perform choice evasion. They can minimise the chance that consumers will 
realise they have the choice to access various different versions of the software and make it 
undesirable for manufacturers to make the best choice of apps for them to compete for their 
custom. This allows the dominant firm to capitalise on the network benefits that such a tie 
provides and make entry more difficult for competitors. This raises the question; why has the 
Commission itself not explicitly stated that this is its concern in the software market? It is 
possible, that the Commission is only starting to discover this form of foreclosure due to the 
failure of its previous remedies, such as the provision of Windows N in Microsoft I, and 
therefore the Commission is only just learning of its existence. Nonetheless, it appears that, 
through trial and error and careful examination of the particular characteristics of the market, 
the Commission is adapting to these difficulties in order to try to spur competition in software 
markets and is now crafting remedies (or commitments) that are better suited to this aim.  
Using ‘choice evasion’ to understand the Google Android decision 
As stated at the beginning of this paper it has been said that ‘[i]t’s hard to find any antitrust 
expert, European or American, who has endorsed the logic or outcome of the ruling by the 
European Commission’.131 In light of this, hopefully the discussion below in the context of 
what has been said above will help balance the situation. The Commission’s investigation 
into Google’s alleged abuse of its position using its Android mobile operating system is 
focused on three matters: 
 
1. Google requiring or incentivising smartphone and tablet manufacturers to exclusively 
pre-install Google’s own applications or services; 
2. Google preventing smartphone and tablet manufacturers from developing and 
marketing modified and potentially competing versions of Android on other devices; 
3. Google tying or bundling certain Google applications and services distributed on 
Android devices with other Google applications, services and/or application 
programming interfaces.132 
 
While the decision has been announced133 it is likely to be months before a full reasoned 
decision is made public. Nonetheless there is already evidence that the exercise of choice is 
a fundamental basis of the decision. While the initial announcement of the fine yielded little 
new information, in the question and answer session after the announcement Lewis Crofts (a 
journalist at the proprietary website MLex) asked why, if the Commissioner had previously 
considered competing apps easy to download, she believed competition was at risk.134 
Commissioner Vestager’s response is telling. She noted that of those who buy Android 
phones, only 1% of them download another search app and only 10% of them download 
another browser. 
                                               
131
 James B. Stewart, 'Why Trump Is Right About the E.U.’s Penalty Against Google' The New York Times 
(New York, 26 July 2018) 
132
 Commission 'Antitrust: Commission opens formal investigation against Google in relation to Android mobile 
operating system' MEMO/15/4782 15 April 2015;  
133
 European Commission - Press release 'Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices 
regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google's search engine' IP/18/4581 (Brussels, 18 
July 2018) 
134
 < https://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?sitelang=en&ref=I159073> (Accessed 01/08/2018) 
This demonstrates that once again choice evasion is a concern here. End users do not 
change their search or browser service.135 Consequently an up-stream company such as 
Google can capitalise on this by requiring or paying downstream third parties to ship devices 
exclusively with their applications and software. When combined with Google tying their own 
services and applications to their Android operating system, users will not exercise their 
freedom of choice to acquire another and their exercise of choice will have been evaded. 
End users may do this because they assume Google search is an inherent part of the 
Android system, that the Google applications are the only applications that are available that 
fulfil that particular function or users might be uncomfortable seeking out and/or downloading 
other applications that have not come pre-installed by either Google or the handset/tablet 
manufacturer. It could be just status quo bias. Exactly which factors come into play and in 
what measure will likely be set out when the final decision is published, but whichever are 
involved, when these issues are considered in combination with potential network effects 
and tipping effects the risk of foreclosure of the market becomes apparent. 
In defence of Google, commentators such as Prof. Akman highlight that despite Google’s 
behaviour ‘the consumer is free to download any other app — for search or browsing — as 
they wish’ in seconds and consequently Google’s behaviour does not in fact foreclosure 
competition.136 It is perfectly feasible that the reason consumers use Google’s apps is less to 
do with status quo bias and just the outright superiority of the apps over their competitors. 
After all, Google’s apps are some of the most popular on iOS, the operating system of Apple, 
Google’s competitor.137 If this is true then consumer behaviour has little to do with choice 
evasion or status quo bias, neither does it foreclose the market. To this point there are two 
counter-arguments however: 
                                               
135
 Or do so very rarely. 
136
 <https://truthonthemarket.com/2018/07/19/will-the-european-commissions-google-android-decision-benefit-
consumers/> (Accessed 01/08/2018) 
137
 The most downloaded Apple App Store apps in the last 10 years include Google Maps and YouTube: 
<https://www.standard.co.uk/tech/app-store-anniversary-top-10-apps-a3883306.html> (Accessed 05/02/2019) 
First, proof of the impact of status quo bias has been addressed directly by Commissioner 
Vestager,138 she noted that on mobile phones using Microsoft’s operating system 75% of 
searches were carried out with Bing, Microsoft’s own search engine. If customers really are 
keeping Google search on their phones because they actively want it, it would be expected 
that Microsoft’s users would switch their search service to Google rather than using Bing. 
The fact that, as a whole, users appear to use whatever search is set as default on their 
phone strongly supports the Commission’s argument that it is pre-installation and default 
settings that are driving the use of these apps. Consequently, requiring manufacturers to 
ship all handsets with Google’s software could help foreclose certain app markets, even if it 
does not foreclosure them entirely. 
Second, even if Google’s apps are in fact superior and without the prohibited behaviour 
‘Google apps will remain the preferred apps of billions of users’139 because users and 
manufacturers will actively seek them out in order to use them on their devices, this does not 
nullify the Commission’s position. Should Google’s apps continue to be used after the 
abusive behaviour has ceased, Google will simply be competing on the merits, which is what 
EU competition law is intended to achieve in the first place. This does not mean the 
Commission has failed by pursuing Google for the infringements. By way of analogy, Usain 
Bolt is in likelihood the fastest 100m runner in the whole world. If however he decided to use 
a banned substance in a race,140 he would not be able to challenge his disqualification on 
the basis that he is the fastest man alive and would have won anyway. If he is, there is no 
reason for him to take the performance enhancing drugs. Likewise, Google cannot break 
established EU competition law principles and then argue that they dominate the market 
because of the superiority of their products/services. If customers will genuinely seek out 
and use Google’s apps over and above whichever is installed as a default on the device, it is 
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unnecessary to require manufacturers to install Google apps as a contractual requirement 
and financially wasteful to grant manufacturers ‘significant financial incentives’141 to install 
them exclusively. Consequently, even if the market remains largely the same after the 
infringements are brought to an end, that will be a testament to the needlessness of the 
infringing behaviour rather than a flaw in the decision against Google. 
The way forward 
This raises the question: What impact will choice evasion have on competition enforcement 
in the next decade and beyond? The features of the software market that allow choice 
evasion142  are likely to become increasingly common as the digital age continues to 
revolutionise industry after industry and those new digital elements increasingly depend on a 
network of interconnection and communication, also known as the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT). 
With this in mind, how can dominant companies ensure their behaviour falls within the 
permitted limits of competition? Which technology companies have business models that are 
liable to bring them into conflict with the law through restricting freedom? If the approach of 
the Commission and courts is not clear dominant companies’ directors may feel unable to 
make decisions in highly dynamic digital markets because they have a limited ability to 
decern what is legal and what is not. The damaging effect on competition and innovation in 
such a scenario is axiomatic. 
It is therefore essential for dominant digital companies to understand the following three 
points: 
First, the Commission is not trying to ‘punish’ US competitors. While it is true to say that 
many of the major competition cases and statements of objections that have come from the 
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Commission in recent years have been directed towards US companies, some of the 
targeted business practices are well established breaches of EU competition law. Take for 
example Google, on the one hand the Google Shopping case143 targets a new practice of 
advantaging ones own services in search results, this is indeed a relatively novel type of 
abuse. In contrast however, the forthcoming decisions on Android and Adsense relate to 
what appears to be allegations of tying144 and exclusivity contracts, behaviours that EU 
competition law clearly pronounced to be abusive long before Google even existed. 
Therefore, it is possible that rather than there being an anti-US bias, these decisions are 
more of a surprise to US undertakings because, unlike in the EU, US antitrust law is 
informed more by the Chicago-School. Consequently if the theoretical differences between 
the EU and US legal systems are not recognised undertakings may feel they are being 
pursued for legitimate business practices. 
Second, firms with some business models are more at risk of being found to have abused 
their position in this regard than others. To begin, Apple Inc, is unlikely to have much to fear 
in relation to this particular type of abuse. Apple Inc tends to have an entirely internal 
technological ‘ecosystem’. This has been described as building a ‘walled garden’.145 They 
write software for their own phones, laptops and tablets. Consequently there is little 
opportunity to require third party hardware manufacturers to install their applications or 
software. They are the only manufacturer of Apple phones and other hardware and this 
means they have complete control over which software their products are shipped with. As a 
result, they are unlikely to need to be concerned by this sort of infraction.146 Second, looking 
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at Amazon as another example, Amazon operates both on the platform level as an online 
market place while also operating as a retailer selling its own products on the platform. 
Operating at the upstream level means any behaviour that conceals competing products, 
makes them more difficult for users to find or removes them from the platform will likely be 
seen to erode consumers’ freedom of choice. This points to another issue that could affect 
Google, Microsoft, Apple and Amazon. Extrapolating the decision from the Google shopping 
case suggests that should Alexa, Cortana, Siri, Google Assistant or any other digital 
assistant become dominant, they will be under a legal obligation not to exclude other 
services in favour of their own as this would be interfering with customers’ freedom to 
choose the products and services most appropriate for them.147 
Third, looking further into the future, the Internet of Things will require products to 
interconnect and work together effectively. This may result in a dominant, open source 
operating system that can be modified by manufacturers; an Android for your kettle, 
refrigerator and television. In such a scenario it is essential for the owner of that system, if 
also operating in the downstream market, to allow third parties to put their own competing 
applications onto that system, allow competing products to work with that system, avoid 
implementing exclusivity arrangements in relation to their own applications and to try to 
make it clear, where their own applications are installed, that they are additional elements 
not part of the operating system. 
                                                                                                                                                  
their app store market and how that may disadvantage third party software firms or using developers profits 
from the app store as leverage to prevent competiting software being developed. Consider: 
<http://lineadirettaeuropa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/European_Innovators_Open_letter.pdf> (Accessed on 
12/02/2019); <https://www.iphoneincanada.ca/news/apple-japan-app-store/> ; 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/business/china-apple-app-store.html> (Accessed 12/02/2019) ; Tim 
Bradshaw, Supreme Court to review Apple app store commissions case (19 June 2018) Financial Times. 
147
 Consider in this light the comments of Prof. A Ezrachi in relation to digital assistants ‘you get a sense of how 
we are truly outsourcing a lot of our decision making. So what we have is now voice controlled activation … it 
take us a step further away from the decision making, for the extreme cases, when one of you or more of you 
were willing to move into the second or third page of the search, you still had some choice. With voice 
activation that is all gone. What you get is a single answer to your question. … This has an impact on the market 
for products, the market for services, … because what you have is a single gatekeeper that controls much of 
what you do.’; Ariel Ezrachi, 'on competition, data, privacy, and artificial intelligence' Panel 1, (Shaping 
Competition Policy in the Era of Digitisation, Brussels 17/01/2019) <https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/shaping-
competition-policy-in-the-era-of-digitisation> accessed 05/03/2019> 
In short, a company can open up their operating system/platform to benefit from the 
creativity, ingenuity, lower risk, flexibility and breadth of choice created by an open system or 
they can build a ‘walled garden’ where their own software is installed on their own hardware 
and hold complete control over which applications are pre-installed and their default settings, 
but, what is crucial to understand, is that they cannot do both. 
Conclusion 
This article highlighted the difficulties that dominant technology companies have faced in the 
last two decades of competition enforcement in the EU. It has been explained that in order to 
understand the manner in which EU competition law is being applied to these fast-moving, 
dynamic markets it is necessary to understand the foundational aims of competition law in 
the EU by investigating the theoretical influences on the law. 
Finding two distinct periods of theoretical influence, it was argued that during the first period 
only the influence of Ordoliberalism was apparent. In the second period, Ordoliberal aims 
were still pursued, but with the assistance of a number of economic approaches and insights 
gathered from numerous sources including the Chicago School, Post-Chicago analysis and 
even behavioural economics.  
Understanding the implication of these theoretical influences, in particular, the Ordoliberal 
aim of preserving economic freedom has provided the opportunity to better analyse the 
Commission’s approach to competition in software markets. This has revealed that the 
unique combination of characteristics of the software market148 give rise to a situation where 
choice evasion can take place. This is where dominant undertakings are able to exploit 
these characteristics in order to obfuscate the options that consumers have and minimise 
the chance of consumers exercising their freedom of choice. Through this they can restrict 
competition. It has been argued that the EU competition authorities are now adapting their 
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approach to software firms that have abused their dominant position. They are crafting 
remedies that aim to ensure that customers are aware of the differences between various 
services and software and exercise their freedom to choose the combination of software that 
they consider superior. 
This analysis is relevant for two fundamental reasons, first it provides greater understanding 
of how tying is established and what aims and principles underlie tying law: It shows that the 
Commission and courts have consistently sought to protect customer freedom.149 This 
analysis is applicable regardless of the relevant market. Secondly, it has explained how the 
characteristics of the software market mean that the law is developing to prevent dominant 
software firms from using choice evasion to limit competition in the market. This novel theory 
of anti-competitive harm explains why the law on software tying is developing in the present 
manner, it allows the current progression of the law to be better understood and makes it 
possible to predict how the law is likely to be applied in future. On the basis of this, it has 
been recommended that technology companies that are dominant on a market and operate 
down stream of that market both now and in future ensure; that they do not universally and 
irreversibly integrate their downstream products with their upstream product, that they leave 
third parties free to install and integrate their own products and services with their upstream 
product and allow customers the freedom to choose the combination that they consider best. 
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 providing further evidence that this area of law is based upon or has been significantly influenced by 
Ordoliberalism 
